Make icebreakers the new Canadian specialty
Prime Minister Mark Carney is building big, and United States President Donald Trump can tariff whatever the fuck he wants—Canada will not bend over.
That’s the clear message since the collapse of trade talks 10 days ago.
Let’s start with $11-billion in new icebreakers. Carney did. On Aug. 24, after Trump’s tantrum, the prime minister schlepped to Lévis, Que., and ordered six new icebreakers. These Polar Class 3 vessels will be deployed to allow longer transit seasons in the North, keep sea lanes in the Atlantic open longer and—critically—bump up Canada’s bona fides in the Arctic.
As the release from the Prime Minister’s Office points out, when everything we’ve ordered over the last few years is delivered and in service, Canada will have the largest icebreaking fleet in NATO.
That ain’t nothin’.
For decades, some of us have been screaming into the procurement ether that merely buying fewer quantities of every system the Americans can provide is not a viable, reasonable, or responsible defence strategy.
Rather, the sensible path for a country like Canada is to pick things that are particularly relevant to us and invest heavily in those areas in order to become one of the best in class.
There are already areas where this is the case, such as emergency water purification in disaster or combat areas; submarine and anti-submarine warfare—despite inferior equipment for the last several decades; and special operations, led by the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) Joint Task Force 2.
It’s now conceivable that icebreaking could be one of those domains of expertise. At a time when climate change is already opening up shipping lanes through Canadian waters, this is not only a good idea—it is mission critical.
Why? Because the era of Canada cosplaying as an Arctic nation is over. We are now in the era of “use it or lose it.”
The presence of foreign vessels in our waters is no longer a future-tense event—it is happening this summer. That’s reality.
So, building icebreakers is a super important first step.
But it isn’t enough.
It’s now time to have a serious discussion about arming the Canadian Coast Guard in general, and specifically the assets intended for the Far North. This includes all the new icebreakers and the Canadian Coast Guard versions of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) that have been rolling out of the Irving shipyard.
But, to what extent should they be armed?
First and foremost, there absolutely must be an integrated comms and sensors package aboard all Coast Guard boats operating in the North.
In a modern military, every vehicle, system, soldier, weapon, etc., has to be a sensor platform feeding information into integrated information processing and planning.
A critical part of being able to do this is the recently announced funding of the Telesat Lightspeed satellite constellation. This will provide the capability to have near-instantaneous communication with Canada’s high Arctic, something previously not possible.
As a result, new icebreakers and AOPS cannot be an exception to building a CAF-wide integrated sensor system.
Second, we need to get real about the offensive and defensive weapons systems being deployed in the North overall. We can start by upgrading the weapons systems on the Royal Canadian Navy’s AOPS vessels. The vessels were intended to operate in a low-threat environment and we can no longer guarantee that describes the Far North.
Rather than tearing up the boats and putting them into a major refit, let’s start by adding significant, drone-based offensive and defensive capabilities. Both air and sea systems, please. Maybe the close-in weapons system from the soon-to-be-paid-off Halifax-class frigates, too.
This might only be a stop gap. These boats are never really going to be up to a heavily contested environment like, say, the Strait of Hormuz. That’s not what they were built for. And it’s unlikely that is what the North is going to look like any time soon. But a beefier AOPS should have an important impact on demonstrating Canada’s commitment to policing its own northern waters.
The navy has started to plan for a class of Arctic-capable corvettes that should be able to provide significant offensive and defensive capabilities against air- and sea-based threats. These will be an important capability.
And, to be clear, the ultimate weapons Canada will be fielding in the North are the Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems’s Type 212CD submarines we will be acquiring and fielding starting in 2034. Having one or more U-boats covertly patrolling Canada’s Arctic waters at any given time will be huge given their considerable defensive and offensive capabilities.
Next, let’s agree that the Coast Guard’s AOPS and icebreakers need—at a minimum—a significantly upgraded sensor package so that the CAF gets maximum value out of the time they spend in the Arctic in terms of acquired data. It then seems self-evident that they also need the ability to defend themselves.
Now, will that be the primary mission for them or icebreakers? Nope. But I don’t believe we can afford to continue to discount the possibility of them needing to defend themselves entirely.
(I also acknowledge that this would create a challenge with the current union agreements under which the Coast Guard operates, but I think that was inevitable as soon as it was—correctly—moved to the Department of National Defence.)
Canada is no longer in a position to assume the co-operation of what was until recently our closest ally. In fact, we need to be prepared for the possibility of them becoming an adversary.
In the context of trade routes, mineral exploration, and Trump’s constant threats to annex both Canada and Greenland, the North is the key area of focus for all of Canada’s preparations.
As a result, failing to seize every opportunity—including those presented by a new, large fleet of icebreakers—would be nothing short of dereliction of duty.
Jamie Carroll is a former national director of the Liberal Party of Canada and is now a consultant and entrepreneur.
The Hill Times